000 persons employed in this industry, including technicians, specialists, naval strategy developers, making it the third largest Allied naval force. The maintenance strategy was also unsuccessful, since the vessels needed more harbour stationing days that operational days. This situation led, in turn to a series of unfortunate situations - the Canadian navy could not maintain a well-cooperation and synergy within the convoys since the ships and the personnel were in a continuous change - one time in the war waters, and one time in harbour decks, performing maintenance and other regular procedures.

Factors that explain the situation

In the opinion of the article writers, the main responsibility for Canada's inability to provide a proper flee relies in the hands of Central authorities, more specifically the Government, the British Admiralty, the Canadian Minister for Internal Affairs. It seems that the authorities feared the reaction of the public regarding the Government expenditure on war preparation. We have to remind ourselves that the role of the Government is to care for its citizens, offering them proper economic, social and environmental development opportunities, but also enabling them the security and tranquillity of tomorrow. The latter dimension of the Governmental prerogatives was neglected, since the tranquillity of Canadian citizens, and moreover, of the citizens from the Democratic world was endangered by the German conquering aspirations. The lack of spending for enhancing the naval fleet, which later on led to the use of commercial vessels and improper and obsolete equipments imported from Great Britain, was mainly caused by the public opinion disagreement on war preparation, and consequently on navy quality and quantitative upgrade. A clear point should have been made that Canadian forces will be used for exclusive defence operations, and will not be based on destructions and international aggressions.

A second reason that explains the average performances of the Canadian navy was the improper collaboration between the Canadian naval and air forces. These military lines were both at their beginning, each wanting its own independence. Although assigned to work together, there was an obvious lack of communication at all levels. Seen by the specialists as...

The next paragraph will include a description of the tactics and the strategies that influenced the war developments, on what concerns the Canadian naval forces.
Strategy and tactics

The war found Canada unprepared for the situation ahead. Therefore, the military and the politic specialists had to formulate strategy and tactics according to the limited financial and time resources. The fundamental tactics adopted by the authorities was to follow the Allies intentions - first Great Britain and U.S.. This would just seem normal, according to first article, as the Canadian war ships represented British vessels that were not presently used by the English forces. The task of the Canadian navy was to defend British and American convoys, travelling with war machines and supplies, against the German U - boats and submarines, which presented a higher technological level.

The opinions of the two article writers

Marc Milner discusses in his article the contribution of the Canadian navy for the triumph on the Atlantic and Pacific waters. The authors remarks the extraordinary explosion of the Canadian naval capacity - from modest numbers in 1939 to a 50 fold increase up to the end of the war in 1945.

Roger Sarty acknowledges the difficulties encountered by the Canadian ships in fighting German U- boats, highlighting the shortcomings of the Canadian naval force. In my opinion, both articles are properly written, inducing the reader into the naval war time, offering interesting details on the topic. If we consider the references brought by the two authors for elaborating those articles, we may claim the authenticity of their writings.

Bibliography

1) Milner, Marc the implications of technological Backwardness: the Canadian Navy 1939-45, Canadian Defence Quartely, 9,3 Canadian Military History: Selected Readings Pg 298-312

2) Sarty, Roger the Maritime Defence of Canada, 1996, Pg 183-216